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  Concentration in agriculture and the accompanying monopoly power impacts 
have long been of interest to economists.  However, while industry concentration in 
agriculture has a long history, the analysis of concentration and normative 
recommendations on it are a source of ongoing controversy in agricultural economics.  
The received approach to industry concentration is that of the structure-conduct-
performance model in which data on the number of firms, prices, and profits are used to 
measure and draw conclusions on firm concentration (for example, Bain).  An alternative 
approach is applied using the new empirical industrial organization (for example, Perry, 
1978).  However, each of these approaches wants for the specific firm-level decision 
process that produces its predicted outcome.  In the first case, the observed industry 
structure is implicitly compared with a perfectly competitive market structure, with the 
classical assumptions relating the number of firms to firm behaviour.  In the second case, 
the specific nature of competitive behaviour between firms is assumed and simulated.        
  While both of these approaches are pervasive in the literature, they focus on 
desire to extract monopoly/monopsony rents as motivations for market concentration.  
Another, perhaps equally important factor resulting in market concentration is the internal 
motivations for vertical and horizontal integration that exists within firms.  That is, the 
management decisions made by the firm to internalize or outsource operational and 
marketing activities drive integration which can ultimately result in fewer buyers and   2
sellers; this is the focus of new theories of the firm.  From this perspective, market 
concentration results from more than simply competition for economic rents among 
firms.    
  The conventional approach to integration and concentration in an industry is to 
assess its impact on monopoly power.  The purpose of this paper is to present a survey of 
alternative approaches that focus on the internal management motivations for integration 
and concentration.  An understanding of these “new” theories of the firm brings 
additional analytical insights to the established study of industrial organization, and 
questions the traditional normative judgements of integration and concentration.   
Received Theories of Integration 
  There are two primary received notions related to lateral integration in a market, 
both of which have been the subject of many reviews (for example, Helmberger et al) and 
are typically addressed in an undergraduate economics textbook.  The first relates to the 
capture and exercise of monopoly power.  Firms integrate laterally to reduce the number 
of competitors, thus allowing greater monopoly rents to be captured.  This concept is 
applied both to physical assets (the purchasing of a firm’s plant and equipment by a rival) 
and non-physical assets (purchasing a rival firm’s brands, patents, and customer lists).  
The second significant concept is that lateral integration occurs in industries with high 
fixed costs and significant scale economies.  Thus, by acquiring a rival firm, fixed costs 
can be better spread across a greater output.  For example, integration occurs when two 
firms merge to reduce common administrative or logistics costs.  Alternatively, by 
merging, rival firms allocate research and development costs over a larger output.   3
  Additional ideas related to integration exist in a vertical context.  Helmberger et al 
provide a discussion of vertical motivations for integration.  They note that vertical 
integration can occur due to complementary relationships between successive stages of 
production.  This results from joints products in production or seasonal excess capacity.  
Joint products naturally direct the firms to enter markets for all of the products produced 
in the production process; seasonal excess capacity presents an opportunity to combine 
production of products to obtain capacity utilization economies.  Helmberger et al also 
argued that firms integrate vertically as a means to foreclose an adjacent horizontal 
market.  The intuition is that by vertically integrating, the access of competitors to the 
vertical market is restrained, thus weakening the competitiveness of rivals in the 
horizontal market.  Finally, they suggested that firms vertically integrate in an attempt to 
reduce the price risk in exchanges between vertical stages of a supply chain.           
  However, relatively recent ideas related to concentration and integration are 
introduced by richer, “new” theories of the firm.  The first surrounds the role of 
institutions and asset ownership in explaining the existence and efficiency of the firm.  
Coase (1937) made the observation that the distinguishing mark of firms was the 
“suppression of the price mechanism” of coordination, and inquired as to why some 
activities were coordinated through market transactions while others were coordinated 
through the central direction of entrepreneurs in firms.  His conclusion that there were 
costs associated with discovering, documenting, and implementing prices in market 
transactions established what is now referred to as “transaction costs” approach to the 
theory of the firm.     4
  Another school of thought approaches the firm as a collection of activities 
conducted by a team of employees, and inquires what structures and mechanisms are 
developed by the firm to monitor, renegotiate, deploy, and discipline employees, given 
moral hazard and adverse selection.  Under this approach, the firm is a nexus of contracts 
in which the owner-entrepreneur gets the residual stream of earnings in return for 
organizing and disciplining employees.  This is called the “agency” theory of the firm.   
  A third school of thoughts posits that firms integrate and consolidate to as a 
means to manage vertical and lateral relationships.  Ownership of firm assets is used to 
control conflicts and motivate employees.  This approach combines insights from the 
transactions cost and agency approaches, and is referred to as the “incomplete contracts” 
theory of the firm.   
  These basic ideas provide the fundamental basis for “new” theories of the firm, 
and they provide an alternative perspective from which to analyze concentration in 
agriculture.  The purpose of this paper is to highlight the relevance of these firm-theoretic 
concepts on concentration and integration in agriculture.  The first section of the paper 
highlights they key insights of modern transactions costs.  The second section provides a 
discussion of agency theory and its impact on concentration and integration decisions.  
The third section presents a discussion of incomplete contracts theory and its insights.  
The final section of the paper interprets these insights in the context of observed changes 
in agricultural markets. 
Transactions Costs 
  Transactions cost economics has developed its own set of jargon terms that 
deserve precise definition:     5
•  Asset specificity refers to an investment that is made to support a specific transaction; 
the investment cannot be redeployed to another transaction without a sacrifice in the 
productivity of the asset or an adaptation cost (Besanko, Dranove, and Shanley). 
•  Idiosyncratic transactions are those in which the identity of parties to the transaction 
matter in determining the price at which a good is exchanged; the more specialized a 
good is to a particular trading relationship the more idiosyncratic it is (Williamson, 
1979).  
•  Appropriable quasi-rents result from the excess in value of a specialized asset in its 
intended use over alternative uses (Klein, Crawford, and Alchian). 
•  Incomplete contracts are arrangements in which it is impossible to precisely identify 
all possible contingencies in advance, so breach and renegotiation occur (Besanko, 
Dranove, and Shanley).   
•  Holdup.  A firm holds up its trading partner by attempting to renegotiate the contract 
terms to appropriate quasi-rents (Besanko, Dranove, and Shanley). 
  Coase (1937, 1960) established the idea that firms structure themselves to 
minimize the sum of production and transactions costs.  According to Coase (1937), the 
primary motivations for internal coordination are economies of scale and transactions 
costs.  Another motivation for coordination through the firm rather than the market is the 
problem posed by long-term contracts in which the obligations of parties to an exchange 
can only be expressed in general terms, with the precise details (including what type of 
good is to be traded) left to a later date.  Coase argued that when the ultimate direction of 
resources becomes dependent on the buyer in this way, the “firm” relationship was 
obtained.   6
Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978) connected the coordinational function of the 
firm with opportunism problems.  Their focus was on the incentives for opportunism of 
firms in contractual trading relations with specialized investments.  Specialized 
investments create appropriable quasi rents.  Firms are observed to behave 
opportunistically in attempting to appropriate the quasi-rent after contracts have been 
established, particularly as a bargaining device for future transactions.  Using a number 
of case studies, Klein, Crawford and Alchian found that the greater the size of the quasi 
rent, the greater the prevalence of legalistic over implicit long-term contracts and the 
greater the prevalence of vertical integration.        
Williamson (1979, 1985) viewed the crucial distinction in firm structure as 
idiosyncracy (level of specialization) in transactions.   Completely unspecialized goods 
(commodities) can readily be traded through markets; idiosyncratic goods are not as 
readily traded through markets.  There may initially be many buyers and sellers capable 
of adapting themselves to producing and consuming an idiosyncratic good, but once a 
buyer and seller have made an agreement to transact, the relationship becomes a bilateral 
monopoly (Williamson, 1985, p. 61).  As adaptations occur in the bilateral relationship 
that were not initially anticipated, there are incentives for opportunism and holdup.  For 
example, one party, observing that the other has sunk costs in producing/consuming the 
idiosyncratic good opportunistically insists on a change to the initial terms of trade.  If 
this occurred under market transaction of a commodity good, the relationship would 
dissolve and both parties would simply trade elsewhere.  However, since the good is 
idiosyncratic there are incentives for both parties to renegotiate.  The time and effort 
spent in renegotiation and associated delays result in holdup.  Williamson argued that   7
transactions of idiosyncratic goods traded on a recurring basis should be made using 
long-term contracts specified only at a general level with conditions placed on suitable 
adaptations, or conducted internally by integrating. 
Thus, integration occurs as firms adjust to minimize the sum of production and 
transactions costs.  The basic intuition behind transactions costs and business integration 
is presented in Figure 1
1.  In performing an activity, there are production costs and 
transaction costs.  For products with low levels of idiosyncracy (commodities), specialist 
firms can obtain scale economies in production, so it is lower cost to outsource.   
However, as the product becomes more specialized (idiosyncratic), it is more difficult for 
outsourced specialists to obtain scale economies, and it is relatively less expensive to 
produce internally.  The transaction costs of outsourcing are low for commodity grade 
products; the more idiosyncratic the product, the greater the transaction cost of 
outsourcing.  The total costs are the sum of production and transaction costs.  In the 
figure, the total cost using  internal organization is greater than the outsourced costs for 
levels of idiosyncracy in the product less than X, and internal costs are lower for levels of 
idiosyncracy greater than X.  Thus, for levels of idiosyncracy greater than X, production 
is organized internally; for lower levels than X, it is outsourced.  Note that changes in 
relative transaction costs or  relative production costs affect the location of X.  For 
example, if internet-based communication lowers the transaction costs of outsourcing, the 
relative transaction cost curve and the relative total cost curves shift to the right, and it 
allows more idiosyncratic production to be outsourced.  Also, as newer, more flexible 
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production technology that is developed
2 that effectively makes products less 
idiosyncratic, the relative production cost curve and the relative total cost curve shift to 
the right, which allows greater outsourcing.     
Agency Theory 
The agency theory literature has developed through the use of “principal-agent” 
models and the tools of mechanism design theory.  The problem addressed by these 
models is to structure incentive contracts to balance moral hazard and the enforcement 
costs.  The seminal contribution in this literature is Alchian and Demsetz (1972).  They 
focused on the employee-employer relationship in a firm.  They argued that long-term 
contracts between employer and employee were not the essence of the firm; rather 
contracts between employer and employee were constantly being renegotiated.  The real 
difference in the relationship between the seller-customer and employee-employer lies in 
team production.  Team production is used if it yields an output sufficiently greater than 
the sum of separable individual efforts (due to the joint use of inputs, economies of scale, 
etc.) to cover the costs of organizing individual team members.  There are costs to 
organizing team members because the output of the team is observable, but the 
contribution of individual team members is not.  This gives rise to moral hazard 
(shirking) on behalf of some team members; the role of the entrepreneur-manager in a 
classical firm is to monitor, renegotiate, deploy and discipline team members in return for 
the residual income stream from the team’s effort.  The firm is thus a device policing 
agency problems where there are advantages of team production. 
                                                           
2For examples, see Milgrom and Roberts   10
The basic logic of agency-theoretic models is the following.  In return for the 
residual income stream, the manager of the firm monitors, renegotiates, and enforces 
contracts with employees.  The more significant the benefits of team production, the 
greater the incentive on behalf of the manager to organize activities internally and 
manage relationships with employees.  However, as the costs of monitoring and 
enforcing arrangements with employees increase relative to the benefit of team 
production, the manager has an incentive to sever the employee relationship and 
outsource the activity- the agency problem then shifts to that of structuring relationships 
with private contractors.  Thus, the equilibrium firm relationship posited by agency 
theory balances the benefit of team production and the cost of contract enforcement. 
  The agency theory approach to concentration and integration has spawned a 
diverse literature in economics.  This approach has also been applied extensively in 
agricultural economics; for example Chu et al (reduced nitrate seed corn), and Hueth and 
Ligon (tomatoes).  A notable contribution in the agricultural economics literature is the 
analysis of farm structure in the U.S. and Canada by Allen and Lueck (1998).  Their 
generic model of the farm includes multiple stages of production with uncertainty, 
seasonality of task-effort, and credit constraints for family farms, partnerships, and 
corporate farms.  There are no moral hazard problems on family farms because the 
farmer is the residual claimant on earnings, but farms remain small because of limited 
labor and high debt cost.  Partnerships have a lower debt cost but face moral hazard in the 
choice of effort by the partners, and corporate farms have the lowest debt cost but face 
costs of monitoring the effort of hired labor.  The authors use their model to anticipate a 
number of events in North American agricultural history, including the failure of the   11
Bonanza farms in the Red River Valley and the recent integration of livestock agriculture, 
and test it using 1992 data from British Columbia and Louisiana.  The study concludes 
that only as high levels of seasonality in task-effort and variance in production are 
mitigated do corporate farms become favored over family farms and partnerships. 
Incomplete Contracts Theory 
One of the crucial distinctions among theories of integration and concentration is 
the implicit assumption that is made about risk in business relationships.  Transactions 
cost theory assumes that risks cannot be entirely characterized in a contract, so contract 
breaches can occur.  In contrast, agency theory assumes that all sources of risk can be 
characterized and addressed in a contract, or at least that a specific source of risk due to 
moral hazard can be treated in isolation from others.  The consequence is that in agency 
theory, contracts are conditioned to uncertainty in such a way that breach never occurs.  
However, in reality contract breaches occur and agreements must be renegotiated, so 
rather than being all encompassing (complete), contracts tend to be incomplete.  
  Formal models of incomplete contracts were first established by Grossman and 
Hart (1986), Moore and Hart (1988), and Hart and Moore (1990) as an attempt to 
describe precisely what changes when firms merge.  This literature is now referred to as 
the “property rights” or incomplete contracts approach to firm organization.  Under this 
approach, a firm is defined on the basis of the assets it owns.  Firms wish to own assets 
because contracts are costly.  Contracts are costly because, in the period in which 
investments are made, it is difficult to anticipate all future contingencies, and when 
unanticipated states occur it may not be evident what actions are appropriate until after 
they have occurred.  In addition, the use of assets is non-contractible; it is expensive or   12
impossible to specify all possible uses of an asset in all possible states of the world.  In 
particular, “when it is too costly for one party to specify a long list of the particular rights 
it desires over another party’s assets, it may be optimal for that party to purchase all the 
rights except for those specifically mentioned in the contract” (Grossman and Hart, 
1986).  In other words, ownership conveys residual rights to assets in lieu of specifying 
particular rights to asset use. 
  The incomplete contracts approach assumes that transactions are idiosyncratic, 
and that there are gaps in the contract because it is impossible or prohibitively expensive 
to plan all possible contingencies in advance.  As adaptations occur, there is scope for 
opportunism.  When holdup problems occur, the parties are faced with the option of 
remaining in the bilateral relationship or trading on the spot market, but trading on the 
spot market rather than with each other is costly because of the idiosyncracy in the 
product.  However, both parties must consider the possibility the other will hold it up as 
adaptation and renegotiation occurs.   
  Because the specific uses of assets are non-contractible, asset ownership can be 
used to police the holdup problem.  In the renegotiation process, the holder of residual 
control rights (owner) can impose decisions on the holder of specific rights (manager) 
where the contract is silent, because he retains the right to remove his assets from the 
manager’s control.  A manager that does not own the assets he controls can only threaten 
to remove his own labor from the relationship.  The former threat is less credible than the 
later, which allows the holder of residual control rights a greater share of the ex post 
surplus generated by the bilateral relationship.  However, the holder of specific rights 
may be less motivated because he receives a smaller share of the ex post surplus. Thus,   13
“the benefit of integration is that the acquiring firm’s incentive to make relationship-
specific investments increases since, given that it has more residual control rights, it will 
receive a greater portion of the ex post surplus created by such investments... the cost of 
integration is that the acquired firm’s incentive to make relationship-specific investments 
decreases since, given that it has fewer residual control rights, it will receive a smaller 
portion of the ex post surplus.  
  The essential idea behind incomplete contracts is that there is uncertainty in 
trading relationships, and that not all of this uncertainty is accounted for in a contract, so 
contracts are inherently incomplete.  As conditions change, the parties to a contract must 
adapt and renegotiate obligations, perhaps in ways that were not anticipated by the initial 
terms of the agreement.  As contract renegotiation occurs, there can be disagreement 
between parties as to the new terms, resulting in holdup.  In the limit, the partners may be 
unable to come to an agreement and the relationship dissolves with any specific assets 
redeployed into other, second-best uses.  However, in the contract renegotiation process, 
ownership of assets conveys bargaining power.  An asset owner always has recourse to 
assets where the contract is silent (since only operational control is delegated to a 
manager).  In particular, the owner retains the discretion to fire the manager if he refuses 
to agree to the owner’s terms in renegotiation.  On the other hand, as the manager obtains 
a greater ownership stake in the assets he manages, his incentives to make efficient 
operational and investment decisions improve.  This is because, since ownership conveys 
bargaining power in contract renegotiation, a manager with greater levels of asset 
ownership can guarantee himself a greater share of the eventual gains from the bilateral 
trade relationship (regardless of holdup).  Thus, as Oliver Hart (1995) states it, “the   14
benefit of integration is that the acquiring firm’s incentive to make relationship-specific 
investments increases since, given that it has more residual control rights, it will receive a 
greater portion of the ex post surplus created by such investments... the cost of integration 
is that the acquired firm’s incentive to make relationship-specific investments decreases 
since, given that it has fewer residual control rights, it will receive a smaller fraction of 
the incremental ex post surplus created by its own investments” (page 33).  The problem 
of business organization in this context is to distribute the property rights to assets in such 
a way that decision makers (managers) will make the optimal (or most nearly optimal) 
investment choices. 
  This is illustrated in Figure 2.  The figure illustrates a vertical trading relationship 
between two adjacent stages in a supply chain in which contracts are inherently 
incomplete.  Assume that initially the manager of the adjacent stage owns all the assets 
(integration).  As the manager of the current production stage is granted ownership over 
more of the productive assets he controls, his bargaining position in contract 
renegotiation improves because he now has the discretion to redeploy the assets if holdup  
occurs.  This improves his incentives for investment and the efficiency of the operation, 
so the managerial incentives-based benefits are given by an upward sloping curve.   
However, from the standpoint of the manager-owner of the adjacent stage, as the 
manager of the current stage obtains greater ownership, the probability and severity of 
holdup increases because the manager of the current stage is obtaining greater bargaining 
power, and can thus retain a greater portion of the gains from the bilateral relationship.   
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This diminishes the incentives of the manager-owner of the adjacent stage to make 
beneficial investment decisions, thus reducing the gains generated by the bilateral 
relationship.  Thus, the adjacent stage’s “benefit under holdup” is decreasing as the asset 
ownership of the current stage increases.  The two parties attempt to structure ownership 
in the bilateral relationship to tradeoff these conflicting effects.  In the figure, the optimal 
ownership structure is for the manager of the adjacent stage to grant the manager of the 
current stage ownership of assets up to point A.  In the incomplete contracts framework, 
the parties in a bilateral trade relationship attempt to allocate property rights in 
correspondence to A. 
  The intuition underlying incomplete contracts ideas follows from Figure 2.  If the 
decisions made by the manager conducting the activity become more crucial to the 
success of a bilateral trade relationship (the “managerial incentives” curve is upward 
sloping and shifted to the right), the manager should own more of the assets he operates.  
Conversely, if the manager’s discretion in operating the activity is small (so that the 
managerial incentives curve is flat and shifted to the left, eg. due to narrower scope 
technology) the manager should not own the asset he operates.  The reasoning is that, if 
the manager has little discretion, there is little scope to respond to the incentives granted 
through ownership; he makes the same choices whether he is owns the assets or not.  If 
the manager’s decisions are critical, his choices will be influenced by the fact that he has 
less bargaining power when renegotiation occurs and the manager will respond to the 
incentives given by ownership of assets.   Conversely, the more damaging the impact of 
holdup (“benefit under holdup” curve shifts to the left), the more ownership rights should 
be retained by the adjacent stage.  When the potential for holdup is relatively   17
insignificant to the manager of the adjacent stage, (benefit under holdup curve shifts to 
the right) the efficient ownership structure is for the manager of the current stage to own 
more of the current stage assets.   
Interpreting Concentration and Integration in Agriculture 
The implication of the foregoing on industry concentration and integration in agriculture 
is based on the following stylized facts: 
•  There is an increased demand for unique and niche attributes in food products. 
•  There is an increased demand for assurance and certification that food is safe.  
•  Because it must serve the above demands, agri-food is becoming more of a 
knowledge-based sector. 
•  Improvements in communications and technology make possible detection and 
monitoring of food quality attributes that were not previously possible. 
  Transaction costs models represent the boundaries of the firm (the extent of 
integration) as determined by the costs of conducting external exchanges relative to 
internal transfers.  Transaction costs provide a dichotomous view of concentration.  On 
one hand, the rapid and continuing improvements in information technology have 
dramatically lowered transaction costs for less specialized products.  The costs of finding 
others to trade with and the costs of negotiating have decreased significantly.  In the 
context of the model in Figure 1, decreasing transaction costs shift the relative transaction 
cost curve to the right; so that for a given level of idiosyncracy, it is relatively more 
profitable to outsource activities.  This supports the notion of greater levels of 
specialization and outsourcing (less concentration), which is occurring in many aspects of 
agri-food.   18
  However, the level of idiosyncracy has not remained at constant.  Food and 
agriculture has moved to serve a greater diversity of consumer preferences, and this leads 
to higher levels of idiosyncracy.  Initially at least, this has increased transaction costs.  
Consider the new demands placed on the agri-food system due to GMO segregation, 
identity preservation, and the growth of organic foods.  Additional checks and balances 
are required relative to previous periods in which commodity product was moved through 
the supply chain; It amounts to a de-commoditization of agricultural products.  This shifts 
the relative transaction cost curve to the left in Figure 1, which makes it more profitable 
to conduct activities internally (integrate).  As information technology improves, the 
curve will shift back to the right; however, if the demand for more diverse food products 
continues to increase as well, the offsetting effect occurs.  
  From an agency perspective, integration is limited by managers’ ability to 
monitor, motivate, and discipline employees.  As agri-food evolves toward a more 
knowledge-based industry, it will be increasingly important to effectively compensate 
and motivate more highly skilled employees that deliver specialty attributes in foods.  
Technology is improving monitoring of employee performance, and thus managers’ 
ability to reward employees proportional to actual performance.  At the same time, it 
appears there are increasing benefits associated with extended control of supply chains 
and marketing systems to maintain food safety and quality of supply.  Each of these 
factors argue for increasing levels of integration.  The counterargument is that as 
technology becomes more flexible and capital becomes increasingly scarce, the benefits 
to team production are actually falling- we see this in firms seeking to decrease exposure 
to overhead costs.  Where there are decreasing returns to team production, the ability to   19
better monitor contractees (as opposed to employees) will reduce integration, thus 
reducing concentration.  In agri-food, the former consideration seems more significant 
than the latter, leading to an expectation of greater integration on the basis of agency 
considerations.      
  The implication of incomplete contracts relates to the relative significance of 
ownership in creating beneficial incentives for managers relative to the greater scope for 
holdup.  The ambitious pace of growth in some sectors of agri-food suggests that 
safeguards against holdup are critical, and that integration will be used to protect against 
it.  Consider Smithfield’s acquisition of Murphy Farms as an example.  Smithfield can 
now boast that about 70% of its slaughter hogs are transferred internally.  This has value 
to Smithfield because the cost of holdup (in the form of low or insufficient volumes for 
slaughter, price haggling, or variable quality hogs) could be very damaging.  In the 
Murphy acquisition, Smithfield obtains an existing management and control structure that 
has proven successful, so the negative “management incentive” effect may be small.   
However, if agri-food is to be a knowledge-based industry, mechanisms to motivate and 
reward skilled employees are needed; ownership can be used as an employee motivation 
incentive in contexts where employee discretion is important.  In meeting more diverse 
consumer wants, it appears that motivating employees to use foresight and intuition will 
be increasingly important.  In the context of Figure 2 above, as the demand for unique 
and guaranteed-safe food intensifies, the managerial incentives curve is likely to shift to 
the right, arguing for greater ownership of assets by employees and less integration.  
  As the level of idiosyncracy in food products increases, incomplete contracts 
motivations tend to push business structures toward less integration- incentives dominate   20
the holdup threat.  To the extent that growth is occurring primarily in the niche and 
“certified-safe” foods, this is particularly the case because the focus is on growing and 
exploiting new market niches rather than bargaining over static shares in mature markets.  
In traditional foods with slower growth, there is more of a tendency for industry players 
to argue over benefit shares because the whole market benefit is mature or very slow 
growing. 
Conclusion 
  This paper provides a perspective on integration and concentration in agriculture 
that is frequently ignored.  More commonly, industry concentration is approached from 
the perspective of rival firms competing for monopoly rents.  Here, we highlight the 
internal management motivations for integration, and review alternative analytical 
approaches.  Conventional analysis assumes that firms integrate and consolidate in the 
hopes of obtaining monopoly power, and makes normative judgements on integration and 
concentration on that basis.  This analysis serves to point out that such normative 
judgements limited solely to conventional analysis of industry concentration ignore 
established aspects of firm management.  This may lead to erroneous conclusions related 
to concentration and integration.      
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